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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613 allows a person who is dissatisfied by a 
decision of the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") to "obtain judicial review 
by complying with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act.95 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or 
Court of Appeals to review all final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative hearings. Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 14 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over the 
final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Board correctly apply the plain language of U.C.A.§49-11-
401(3)(c) and (e) which mandate that a retirement system member 
cannot receive more than one year of service credit for one year of 
actual work? 
2. Did the Board correctly determine that under U.C.A.§49-1 l-403(l)(d) 
Petitioner cannot purchase service credit because he has no forfeited 
service credit? 
3. Did the Board correctly deny Petitioner's claim of equitable estoppel 
against the Board as a government agency because he failed to show an 
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unusual circumstance or that he reasonably relied on the Board's 
statements to his detriment? 
4. Were the Board's Findings of Fact sufficient to support its conclusion of 
law that Petitioner failed to prove an estoppel against the Board? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4) specifically enumerates the relief which this Court may grant on an 
appeal from a formal administrative hearing before the Board. Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-16(4) states: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by one of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the 
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by 
any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring 
resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow 
prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
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(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by 
statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the 
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and 
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for 
the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capriciousi 
Norman O. Whitaker ("Petitioner") failed to point to any specific 
subsection for relief under Section 63-46b-16(4) where the Board erred. In a 
recent case involving the Utah State Retirement Board (the "Board") before the 
Court of Appeals the petitioner was admonished for not properly characterizing 
his claims under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4). See, Terrv v. Retirement Board, 
2007 UT App 87. The Utah Court of Appeals has duly noted that because the 
standard of review under Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") will vary 
based on the subsection the claim is brought under, "we strongly encourage 
[future]counsel to clearly identify under what section review is being sought and 
to make certain they identify the appropriate standard of review under that 
section." Id. at f^ 6, quoting, King v. Industrial Com 'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 
1281,1287 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Petitioner does allege in his brief what he believes to be the appropriate 
standards of review. See, Petitioner's Brief at 2-4. However, Petitioner 
mistakenly alleges that the Board erred in its interpretation and application of Utah 
Code Ann. §49-11-401 and the applicable standard of review is a correction of 
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error with no deference to the Board's decision because it involves a legal issue. 
See, Petitioner's Brief at 2. 
Contrary to Petitioner's position, the Utah Supreme Court has held an 
appellate court should grant deference to an agency's interpretation or application 
of law when "there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the language 
in question, either expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory 
language." Morton Int'L, Inc. v. State Tax Comm % 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 
1991). "Where a grant exists, [the appellate court] will not disturb the agency's 
interpretation or application of the law unless its determination exceeds the bounds 
of reasonableness and rationality." King v. Industrial Comm 'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 
1281, 1286 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Thus, if the Board has been granted discretion, 
either expressly or impliedly, to interpret or define the statutory language at issue, 
the Court will not disturb the Board's interpretation unless it exceeds the "bounds 
of reasonableness and rationality." Id. 
Petitioner's position that the Board's interpretation and application of Utah 
Code Ann. §49-11-401 be given no deference directly conflicts with the statutory 
provision granting the Board such discretion. Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401(c) & 
(e) states concerning the Board's powers and duties related to granting service 
credit: 
(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per month, and 
per year upon the basis of which one year of service and 
proportionate parts of a year shall be credited toward 
qualification for retirement. Service may be computed on a 
fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served shall 
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be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all of the 
service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not 
count for more than one year, 
(e) A member may not accrue more than one year of service 
credit per fiscal or calendar year as determined by the office. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This statute grants the Board and the Retirement Office with the express discretion 
to determine eligibility and computation of service credit. As such, the correct 
standard of review in reviewing the statutory language of U.C. A. §49-11-401 is 
clear error and deference to the agency's interpretation and application of the law. 
Petitioner incorrectly argues that Sindt v. Utah State Ret Bd.„ 2007 UT 16 
supports his proposed standard of review. Although the Court in Sindt clearly 
understood the issues surrounding the correct standard of review as it applies to 
the Board in stating, "Absent a grant of discretion, we review the Board's 
application or interpretation of a statute as a question of law under the correction-
of-error standard." Sindt v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 2007 UT 16 f 5; citing Morton 
Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax Comm % 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991); the Court only 
looked to the Board's general power to interpret Title 49, not to the Legislature's 
express grant of authority to determine service credit in U.C.A. §49-11-401. The 
Legislature limited the Board's discretion to define terms in Title 49 to cases when 
the Board "provides written documentation which demonstrates that the 
interpretation or definition promotes uniformity in the administration of the 
systems or maintains the actuarial soundness . . . " U.C.A. §49-ll-203(l)(k). 
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However, as stated supra, the Legislature granted the Board and the Retirement 
Office the broad authority to calculate service credit under U.C.A. §49-11-401. 
In sum, because the Board and the Retirement Office has been granted with 
the express discretion to determine eligibility and computation of service credit 
under Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401, the correct standard of review is deference to 
the Board's interpretation and application of the law in this case. 
The Board agrees with Petitioner that the standard of review on his 
equitable estoppel claim is "clear error" on the facts, and correctness on the law. 
See, Petitioner's Brief at 3. This Court recently addressed the correct standard of 
review for claims of equitable estoppel before the Board in Terry v. Retirement 
Board, 2007 UT App 87. This Court found that equitable estoppel claim "presents 
a mixed question, which 'involves the application of law to fact.'" Terry v. 
Retirement Board, 2007 UT App 87 [^8; citing State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f33 
n. 12, 70 P.3d 111 (quotation and citations omitted.). This Court continued "there 
are facts, including policy concerns, an agency's expertise in a specific area of 
law, and the complexity of the given legal question, which may alter the amount of 
deference an appellate court gives an agency's decision when reviewing mixed 
questions of law and fact." Id.; citing Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 
181 (Utah 1997). "Depending on the circumstances, an appellate court may 
review the agency decision with a level of deference 'falling anywhere between a 
review for correctness and a broad abuse of discretion standard.'" Id. In 
reviewing the underlying facts applied to equitable estoppel this Court applied a 
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"deferential clear error standard/' and "no deference need be given [the Board's] 
resolution of such questions of law." Id. This same standard should be applied 
here to Petitioner's estoppel claim. 
This Court in Terry also provided the correct standard of review for issues 
involving due process. The Court found, "'questions regarding whether an 
administrative agency afforded a petitioner due process in its hearings are 
questions of law,' which we review for correctness." Id. at f9; quoting Sierra 
Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335, 347 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401. Transfer of service credit — Eligibility for 
service credit — Computation of service credit — Retirement from most recent 
system. 
(1) (a) The office shall make the transfer of service credit, together with related 
member and participating employer contributions, from one system to another 
upon terms and conditions established by the board. 
(b) The terms and conditions may not result in a loss of accrued benefits. 
(2) Transfer of employment from a position covered by one system to a 
position covered by another system does not cause the employee to lose active 
member status. 
(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions apply: 
(a) A person employed and compensated by a participating employer who 
meets the eligibility requirements for membership in a system or the Utah 
Governors' and Legislators' Retirement Plan shall receive service credit for the 
term of the employment provided that all required contributions are paid to the 
office. 
(b) An allowance or other benefit may not accrue under this title which is based 
upon the same period of employment as has been the basis for any retirement 
benefits under some other public retirement system. 
(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per month, and per 
year upon the basis of which one year of service and proportionate parts of a 
year shall be credited toward qualification for retirement. Service may be 
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computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served shall be 
accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all of the service rendered in 
any one fiscal or calendar year may not count for more than one year. 
(d) Service credit shall be accrued on a fiscal or calendar year basis as 
determined by the participating employer. 
(e) A member may not accrue more than one year of service credit per 
fiscal or calendar year as determined by the office. 
(f) Fractions of years of service credit shall be accumulated and counted in 
proportion to the work performed. 
(4) The office may estimate the amount of service credit, compensation, or age 
of any member, participant, or alternate payee, if information is not contained in 
the records. 
(5) A member shall retire from the system which most recently covered the 
member. 
(Emphasis added.) 
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Norman O. Whitaker ("Petitioner") filed a Request for Board Action on 
January 18, 2006, requesting the Utah State Retirement Board (hereinafter 
"Board") grant his request that he receive more than one year of retirement service 
credit for one fiscal or calendar year of work. Hearing Record (hereinafter "HR") 
at 4. A hearing was held on June 14, 2006 before Administrative Hearing Officer 
(hereinafter "AHO"), Richard C. Howe, on Petitioner's Request for Board Action. 
See, HR at 383. Petitioner was represented by Phillip W. Dyer of the Law Offices 
of Phillip W. Dyer. The Board was represented by David B. Hansen. After 
reviewing the post hearing papers, the AHO ruled in favor of the Board and 
directed Mr. Hansen, counsel for the Board, to draft a proposed Order. See, HR at 
239-240. Petitioner filed written objections to the proposed Order on September 
12, 2006. See, HR at 275. The Board responded to Petitioner's written objections 
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to the proposed Order on September 19, 2006. See, HR at 339. An amended 
Order was signed by the AHO on October 26, 2006. See, HR at 376; See also 
attached Addendum A. The Board adopted the amended Order on November 9, 
2006. See, HRat377. Petitioner filed his Petition for Review in this matter on 
December 7, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/ FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. Petitioner is a member of the Public Employees Non-Contributory 
Retirement System ("PERS") due to his employment with the State of Utah 
("State") and West Point City ("City"). Petitioner is also a member of the 
Public Employees Contributory Retirement System due to his previous 
employment with Davis and Weber County Canal Agency ("County"). HR 
at 370. 
2. PERS and PECRS are administered by the Utah State Retirement Office 
("the Retirement Office"). Id. at 371. 
3. Petitioner began working for the State on April 15, 1989, and is currently 
an active employee. Id. 
4. Petitioner began working for the City on January 1, 1994, and is currently 
an active employee. Id. 
5. Petitioner was employed with the County from November 1, 1989, through 
April 30, 1993. Petitioner worked for a total of 3.5 years for the County. 
Id. 
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The Retirement Office sends out annual statements to all members who 
have contributions on record. The annual statements include total years 
worked for all participating employers. For example, the statement sent out 
after the end of 2004 read in part as follows: 
"SERVICE CREDIT PER SYSTEM AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004 
CONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [1] 3.500 YEARS 
NONCONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [2] 10.834 YEARS 
NONCONTRIBUTORY STATE AND SCHOOL [2] 15.654 YEARS" 
"PLEASE EXAMINE THIS STATEMENT - If the balances shown on 
the accompanying statement are not correct, please write promptly giving 
details of any differences to our auditors, Deloitte & Touche, Attention: 
URS, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt Lake City, UT 84144-0458, 
who are presently engaged in the regular examination of our financial 
statements. Correspondence should include your name, Social Security 
number, and a copy of this statement. If this statement is correct, no 
reply is necessary." (Emphasis in original). 
Id. 
The following or a similar notification was contained on every annual 
statement sent out by the Retirement Office, "If you are a member in more 
than one Retirement System, if you are a part-time elected or appointed 
official, or if you are employed with two or more employers at the same 
time, you will need to contact the Retirement Office." Id. 
Petitioner testified that in or about October 2003, he contacted the 
Retirement Office to request a retirement estimate. In November 2003, he 
received the retirement estimate notifying him that as of May 16, 2006, 
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assuming continued full-time employment, he would have a total of 17.087 
years of service credit. Id. at 372. 
9. Marcia Stroud, Retirement Advisor for the Retirement Office, testified that 
on August 29, 2005, at Petitioner's request, she sent Petitioner a new 
retirement benefit estimate showing the calculation of Petitioner's 
retirement service credit. Different from the 2003 estimate, this estimate 
included a three-year service credit purchase for military service. The 
estimate showed that on May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time 
employment, Petitioner would have 20.087 years of service credit. Id. 
10. Petitioner testified that on November 2, 2005, in a meeting with himself, 
Mr. Felshaw King, and Retirement Office employees Marcia Stroud and 
Chris Blevins, the Retirement Office clearly explained to Petitioner that he 
was not eligible for more than one year of service credit for one fiscal or 
calendar year of work. Id. 
11. Petitioner testified that he has not retired or terminated his employment 
with either the State or the City. Id. 
12. Petitioner testified that had he known in 1994 that he could not count 
toward his retirement two years of service credit for each year that he 
worked for two employers, he would have accepted another position with 
West Point City, would have resigned has job with the State, and would 
have gone back to work in the construction industry with his brother as an 
appraiser and would have earned about $3,000 more per year. Petitioner 
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provided no other evidence that he sustained injury or harm due to his 
reliance on the Retirement Office's annual statements. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The language in U.C.A. §49-1 l-401(3)(c) and (e) is plain that a member of 
the retirement systems cannot receive more than one year of retirement service 
credit per fiscal or calendar year. This section states: 
(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions apply: . . . 
(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per month, and per year 
upon the basis of which one year of service and proportionate parts of a 
year shall be credited toward qualification for retirement. Service may be 
computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served 
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all of the 
service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not count for more 
than one year. 
(e) A member may not accrue more than one year of service credit per 
fiscal or calendar year as determined by the office. 
(emphasis added). 
The language in U.C.A. §49-1 l-401(3)(c) is plain and not capable of two or 
more plausible meanings. The phrase "all of the service" in subsection 3(c) 
contains no qualification or limitation. The word "all" cannot be interpreted to 
mean something less than the entire duties and obligations a member has 
performed which might be counted for retirement service credit. However, 
Petitioner provides no rationale why this particular limitation to the word "all" 
should be used, as opposed to any other implausible non-textual phrases. Thus, 
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Petitioner's request for a finding of ambiguity in U.C.A. §49-11 -40 l(3)(c) should 
be rejected. 
However, even if this Court were to find U.C.A. § 49-11-401(3) 
ambiguous, this Court should defer to the Board's reasonable and rational 
conclusions of law because the Legislature explicitly granted the board and the 
office the authority to interpret and apply these subsections. See, U.C.A. § 49-11-
401(3). The Board's position is and has always been that a person cannot receive 
more than one year of service credit in any one year. 
Similarly, U.C.A. §401(3)(e) specifically gives the Retirement Office the 
discretion to determine and limit service credit to one year for each fiscal or 
calendar year. It is undisputed that the Retirement Office's consistent policy was 
that Petitioner could only receive one year of service credit for each year he 
worked. Hence, even if a portion of the section is found to be ambiguous, the 
plain language of U.C.A. §401(3)(c) and (e) give the Board and the Retirement 
Office discretion to determine the accrual of service credit during a fiscal or 
calendar year. Because the Board and the Retirement Office policy is both 
reasonable and rational that any member could receive one year of service credit 
per fiscal or calendar year, this Court should defer to the Board's legal conclusions 
finding, "Petitioner is precluded by Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401(3 )(c) and (e) 
from earning more than one year of service credit in any one calendar or fiscal 
year." HRat373. 
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In the alternative, even if this Court finds ambiguity and reviews the 
Board's Order under a correction of error standard, public policy favors the 
Board's application of the statute. Multiple states have similar statutes limiting 
service credit to one year for each year worked. Yet, none of these states have 
ever interpreted their statutes in the way Petitioner desires. 
Further, sound actuarial principles prevent the retirement office from 
paying out benefits long before they are intended to become available to 
Petitioner. When Petitioner qualifies for retirement, he will receive a benefit 
based on all his service with each employer. If Petitioner were to receive his 
retirement benefit now, he would receive a much higher benefit for working much 
less time than a similarly situated employee working only one job. The board is 
not aware of any public policy favoring an employee in two jobs over an employee 
in only one position. Thus, public policy and general notions of fairness also favor 
to board's conclusion of law. 
Petitioner also incorrectly argues that he should be able to purchase service credit 
under U.C.A. §49-1 l-403(l)(d) as "forfeited" service credit. Yet, because 
Petitioner never forfeited any of his service credit, he is not eligible to purchase 
service credit under that section. First, he had no service credit to forfeit. Because 
of the limitations in U.C.A. §49-11-401(3) discussed supra, his service credit was 
limited to one year for each year worked. Thus, Petitioner had nothing to forfeit. 
Second, neither Petitioner nor the Retirement Office did anything to 
effectuate a forfeiture of service credit. Although no specific statutory provision 
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governs the forfeiture or relinquishment of service credit prior to retirement, 
U.C.A. §49-11-619 allows a retiree or beneficiary of a retirement benefit to 
"relinquish" or forfeit "a benefit under this title by signing an irrevocable written 
relinquishment." Without such a signed statement, no relinquishment or forfeiture 
is accepted by the Retirement Office. As such, Petitioner does not qualify to 
purchase service credit under U.C.A. §49-11-403. 
In addition, Petitioner's claim for equitable esoppel also should be denied. 
The Board correctly found that Petitioner failed to prove an unusual circumstance 
to obtain estoppel against the Board as a governmental entity. Yet, even if the 
court applies the common law estoppel rules, Petitioner failed to prove reasonable 
reliance and harm due to the Board's statements to Petitioner. 
"As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental 
entity. In Utah, there is a limited exception to this general principle for 'unusual 
circumstances' 'where it is plain that the interests of justice so require.' This 
exception applies, however, only if 'the facts may be found with such certainty, 
and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.'" 
Anderson v. Public Service Comm % 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(finding that 
Commission was not estopped from revoking limousine company's certificate of 
convenience and necessity after allegedly orally settling all claims against 
company)(citations omitted). Petitioner's misunderstanding that he could retire 
with over 30 years of service credit which was corrected by the Retirement Office 
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prior to his retirement does not arise to the level of an unusual circumstance 
causing grave injustice. 
Even if Petitioner could sustain an estoppel claim against the Board 
as a governmental entity, Petitioner cannot prove the elements of estoppel. 
Specifically, Petitioner did not prove any statement on which he reasonably relied 
to his detriment. Although Petitioner testified that he would have taken another 
position had he known he could not receive two years of service credit for one 
year of actual work, he provided no written documentation of other jobs available, 
the salary or benefits of those jobs, or any evidence that he was qualified to obtain 
such positions. Petitioner provided no other evidence that he sustained injury or 
harm due to reliance on the Retirement Office's Annual Statements. Because 
Petitioner cannot prove reasonable reliance, or injury based on Retirement Office 
statements, he cannot make a successful estoppel claim against the Board. 
Finally, Petitioner's claim of due process violations regarding the 
accidental loss of part of the original recording is now moot. The record has been 
supplemented with the testimony of Judy Lund from an additional hearing held 
last month for that purpose. In addition, Petitioner provided no explanation why 
any other due process violations existed at the hearing. 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's appeal should be dismissed in its 
entirety. Under Title 49, Petitioner simply cannot receive more than one year of 
service credit for one year of actual work. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE BOARD CORRECTLY APPLIED THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF U.C. A. §49-
11-401(3)(C) AND (E) WHICH MANDATED THAT A RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
MEMBER CANNOT RECEIVE MORE THAN ONE YEAR OF SERVICE CREDIT 
FOR ONE YEAR OF ACTUAL WORK. 
U.C.A. §49-1 l-401(3)(c) and (e) is plain that a member of the retirement 
systems cannot be credited with more than one year of retirement service credit 
per fiscal or calendar year. This section states: 
(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions apply:.. . 
(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per month, and per year 
upon the basis of which one year of service and proportionate parts of a 
year shall be credited toward qualification for retirement. Service may be 
computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served 
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all of the 
service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not count for more 
than one year. 
(e) A member may not accrue more than one year of service credit per 
fiscal or calendar year as determined by the office. 
The plain language of this subsection mandates: 1) "all of the service" 
performed in one year cannot count for more than one year of service credit; and 
2) it explicitly grants the board (in subsection 3(c)) and the office (in subsection 
3(e)) the discretion to determine when a member is eligible and qualifies for 
service credit. 
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A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF U.C.A. §49-11-401(3)(C) AND (E) 
SUPPORTS THE BOARD'S CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT PETITIONER 
IS PRECLUDED "FROM EARNING MORE THAN ONE YEAR OF 
SERVICE CREDIT IN ANY ONE FISCAL OR CALENDAR YEAR." 
The Board correctly held that the plain language of U.C.A. §49-11-
401(3)(c) and (e) mandates that".. . all of the service rendered in any one fiscal or 
calendar year may not count for more than one year." HRat373. "The court's 
principal duty in interpreting statutes is to determine legislative intent, and the best 
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute." Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). Petitioner's 
attempt to manufacture ambiguity in this statute where none exists should be 
rejected. 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth that, "c[u]nder our rules of statutory 
construction, we look first to the statute's plain language to determine its 
meaning.'" Sindt v. Utah State Ret. Bd, 2007 UT 16, Tf8, 157 P.3d 797, 799 
(quoting, Mountain Estates v. State Tax Comm % 2004 UT 86, [^9, 100 P.3d 1206). 
"Only if we find some ambiguity need we look further." CIG Exploration, Inc. v. 
Tax Comm'n, 897 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995)(findingphrase "erroneously or 
illegally collected" in refund statute was not ambiguous and the State Tax 
Commission correctly assessed taxes based on property valuation as of statutory 
valuation date). However, "[t]he fact that the parties offer differing constructions 
of the statute, in and of itself, does not mean that the statute is 'ambiguous.' See, 
Eppersen v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 949 P.2d 779, 783 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 
18 
1997). 'Ambiguous' means capable of 'two or more plausible meanings.9" 
Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998)(quoting, Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 
1993); Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990)). 
The language in U.C.A. §49-11 -401 (3)(c) is plain and not capable of two or 
more plausible meanings. U.C.A. §49-1 l-401(3)(c) states: 
The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per month, and per 
year upon the basis of which one year of service and proportionate 
parts of a year shall be credited toward qualification for retirement. 
Service may be computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and 
portions of years served shall be accumulated and counted as 
service. In any event, all of the service rendered in any one fiscal or 
calendar year may not count for more than one year. 
(emphasis added). 
The phrase "all of the service" in subsection 3(c) contains no qualification 
or limitation. The word "all" cannot be interpreted, as Petitioner suggests, to mean 
something less than the entire duties and obligations a member has performed 
which might be counted for retirement service credit. Only by rewriting the 
statute by adding terms which the legislature never intended can the phrase "all of 
the service" be interpreted to mean something less than "all." Nevertheless, 
Petitioner suggests the Court insert the phrase "for each employer" in the statute 
after the word "rendered." Petitioner's Brief at 27. However, Petitioner provides 
no rationale why this particular limitation to the word "all" should be used and the 
Board refuses to speculate on any other potential non-textual limitations to the 
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word "all." Nevertheless, Petitioner's request for a finding of ambiguity in U.C.A. 
§49-11-401(3)(c) should be rejected. 
Additionally, in reviewing subsection (3)(c) with subsection (3)(e), no 
question exists that the legislature intended to allow a maximum of one year of 
service credit for one year of service or work. Subsection (3)(e) states, "A 
member may not accrue more than one year of service credit per fiscal or calendar 
year as determined by the office." This language is plain and not subject to any 
other interpretation. The language clearly provides that no member can receive 
more than one year of service credit in any one year period. Thus, the plain 
language of the statute clearly supports the Board's Conclusion of Law #2 which 
states: 
2. Petitioner is precluded by Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3) (c) 
and (e) from earning more than one year of service credit in any one 
calendar or fiscal year. These statutory sections are not ambiguous. 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401(3)(c) states, 
The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per 
month, and per year upon the basis of which one year 
of service and proportionate parts of a year shall be 
credited toward qualification for retirement. Service 
may be computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and 
portions of years served shall be accumulated and 
counted as service. In any event, all of the service 
rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not 
count for more than one year. 
Section (c) does not contain any qualification or limitation. It 
provides that".. .All of the service rendered in any one fiscal or 
calendar year may not count for more than one year." This language 
must be interpreted to mean "all service" rendered by a public 
employee in one year whether to one or multiple employers. 
In addition, Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401(3 )(e) also supports 
this interpretation stating, "A member may not accrue more than one 
year of service credit per fiscal or calendar year as determined by the 
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office." This subsection contains no qualification or limitation that 
would limit its application to one employer. It is immaterial whether 
the service is rendered to one employer or multiple employers. 
HRat373. 
The Board correctly determined that U.C.A. §49-11-401(3)(c) and (e) plainly and 
unambiguously explained that the unqualified phrase "all of the service" meant 
'all service' rendered by a public employee in one year whether to one or multiple 
employers. Id. Thus, Petitioner's request to expand the clear meaning of the statute 
should be rejected. 
B. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS AMBIGUITY IN 
U . C A. § 49-l l -401(3)(C) AND (E), THE COURT SHOULD DEFER TO 
THE BOARD'S REASONABLE AND RATIONAL CONCLUSION OF LAW 
THAT A MEMBER CAN RECEIVE A MAXIMUM OF ONE YEAR OF 
SERVICE CREDIT FOR ONE YEAR OF WORK. 
U.C.A. §49-11-401(3)(c) and (e) contain no ambiguity and the plain 
language of these subsections limits a member to earning one year of service 
credit during any one fiscal or calendar year. However, even if this Court were to 
find these subsections ambiguous, this Court should defer to the Board's 
reasonable and rational conclusions of law because the legislature explicitly 
granted the board and the office the authority to interpret and apply these 
subsections. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Morton InVl, Inc. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 
814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991), 
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In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, we held that an agency's interpretation of 
statutory provisions is entitled to deference when there is more than one 
permissible reading of the statute and no basis in the statutory language or 
the legislative history to prefer one interpretation over another... .[I]n the 
absence of a discernible legislative intent concerning the specific question 
in issue, a choice among permissible interpretations of a statute is largely a 
policy determination. The agency that has been granted authority to 
administer the statute is the appropriate body to make such a determination. 
Indeed, both the legislative history to section 63-46b-16 and our prior cases 
suggest that an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for the 
agency's judgment concerning the wisdom of the agency's policy. When 
there is no discernible legislative intent concerning a specific issue the 
legislature has, in effect, left the issue unresolved. In such a case, it is 
appropriate to conclude that the legislature has delegated authority to the 
agency to decide the issue. Such an approach is particularly appropriate 
when it is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended the agency to 
have some discretion in dealing with the statutory provision at issue, 
(footnotes omitted). 
The Morton Court found that grants of authority may either be explicit or 
implicit. See, Morton, 814 P.2d at 589. In Morton, the court used an example of 
an explicit statutory grant of discretion to the State Tax Commission when the 
statute stated that certain taxes would be levied "as determined by the 
commission". See, Id. at 588 n.40. On the other hand, an implicit grant of 
discretion is found when "there is no discernible legislative intent concerning a 
specific issue the legislature has, in effect, left the issue unresolved. In such a 
case, it is appropriate to conclude that the legislature has delegated authority to the 
agency to decide the issue." Id. 
In more recent cases, the court reiterated its holding in Morton that the 
court should defer to the agency if authority to interpret and apply the law has 
been granted by the legislature. See e.g., Sindt v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 2007 UT 16. 
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The Court of Appeals interpreted the Morton decision in allowing agency's 
discretion to interpret and apply the law under a "reasonable and rational" 
standard. See, King v. Industrial Comm 'n. of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
In this case, Section 401(3)(c) plainly gives "the board" discretion in 
determining how to credit "service" toward eligibility of the statutory defined 
retirement benefit. It states, "the board shall fix the minimum time . . . upon 
which one year of service . . . shall be credited toward qualification for retirement. 
. . . In any event, all of the service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may 
not count for more than one year." (emphasis added). The legislature recognized 
the board's role in calculating service credit in qualifying for retirement, and 
granted it discretion to fulfill that role. Because the Board maintains the discretion 
to determine service credit under this statute, if this Court finds ambiguity in the 
statutes, this Court should defer to the board's legal conclusions and 
interpretations because they are reasonable and rational. 
The Board specifically stated in its order on this case, "Petitioner is 
precluded by Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3) (c) and (e) from earning more than 
one year of service credit in any one calendar or fiscal year . . . . This language 
must be interpreted to mean "all service" rendered by a public employee in one 
year whether to one or multiple employers." HRat373. The Board's position is 
and has always been that a person cannot receive more than one year of service 
credit in any one year. Certainly no contrary evidence was received at the hearing 
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to show that any individual had ever received more than one year of service credit 
for one year of actual work. Supplemental HT: 13. Thus, because the Legislature 
clearly gave the Board discretion and because the Board clearly determined to 
only allow one year of service credit, no matter the number of jobs, for one year of 
actual work, the court should defer to the Board's legal conclusion if ambiguity is 
found in the statute. 
Similarly, U.C.A. §401(3)(e) specifically gives the Retirement Office the 
discretion to determine and limit service credit to one year for each fiscal or 
calendar year. It unambiguously states, "A member may not accrue more than one 
year of service credit per fiscal or calendar year as determined by the office" 
(emphasis added).1 It is undisputed that the Retirement Office's consistent policy 
was that Petitioner could only receive one year of service credit for each year he 
worked. Again, no evidence was presented to the contrary. In fact, Petitioner 
admits that in November 2003 the Retirement Office specifically told him he 
would have 17.087 years of service credit by May 16, 2006 (one year of service 
credit for each year worked). HT at 145-146. Furthermore, at the hearing, 
Retirement Office employees specifically and consistently testified that the 
1
 This grant of discretion is almost identical to the example the Morton court used 
of a grant of explicit discretion in U.C.A. §59-12-104(16)(1991). See, Morton 814 
P.2d at 588, n.40. That statute stated "sales or leases of machinery and equipment 
purchased or leased by a manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations 
(excluding normal operating replacements . . . as determined by the commission)" 
(emphasis added by the court in Morton.) Thus, because the Utah Supreme Court 
used this language as an example of an explicit grant of discretion in Morton, this 
Court should also find an explicit grant of discretion here. 
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Retirement Office would not allow a member to receive more than one year of 
service credit for one year of actual work. HT at 43-44; 60; Supplemental HT 13; 
29; 45. 
Hence, even if a portion of the section is found to be ambiguous, the plain 
language of U.C.A. §401(3)(c) and (e) gives the Board and the Retirement Office 
discretion to determine the accrual of service credit during a fiscal or calendar 
year. Since the Board and the Retirement Office policy is both reasonable and 
rational in its determination that any member could receive one year of service 
credit per fiscal or calendar year, this Court should defer to the Board's legal 
conclusions finding that: "Petitioner is precluded by Utah Code Ann. §49-11-
401(3)(c) and (e) from earning more than one year of service credit in any one 
calendar or fiscal year." HR at 373. 
C. EVEN IF AMBIGUOUS AND REVIEWED UNDER A CORRECTION OF 
ERROR STANDARD, PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS THE BOARD'S 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING U.C.A. § 49-ll-401(C) AND (E) 
THAT A MEMBER CAN RECEIVE ONLY ONE YEAR OF SERVICE 
CREDIT FOR ONE YEAR OF ACTUAL WORK. 
As stated supra, U.C.A. §49-11-401(3)(c) and (e) contain no ambiguity. 
However, in the alternative, if ambiguity is found, and if this Court determines it 
need not defer to the Board's Conclusions of Law, public policy considerations 
demonstrate that the Board correctly applied the law in accordance with the 
Legislature's intent. When an agency has not been granted discretion, Courts look 
to the legislative history and policy considerations when interpreting ambiguous 
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statutes. "Only when [the Court] find[s] ambiguity in the statute's plain language 
need [the Court] seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations." World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 
P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). "When interpreting an ambiguous statute, [the Court] 
first tr[ies] to discover the underlying intent of the legislature, guided by the 
purpose of the statute as a whole and the legislative history." Hansen v. Salt Lake 
Co., 19 A P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990)(citations omitted). Here, the legislative intent 
can be shown by both reviewing the purpose section of Title 49 and looking to 
other state's statutes. 
A multitude of other public retirement systems have similar statutory 
provisions to U.C.A.§49-11-401(3)(c) and (e) requiring one year of service credit 
for one year of service, and no state allows an employee to earn more than one 
years of service credit for one year worked. A cursory search found that Alaska2, 
Hawaii3, Illinois4, Indiana5, Louisiana6, Maine7, Maryland8, Michigan9, 
2
 The Alaska Teacher's Retirement System prohibits more than one year of service 
credit per one calendar year in AK ST § 14.25.169, which states: " . . . A teacher 
may not receive (1) duplicate credit under this plan for the same period of service, 
(2) more than one year of service credit in the course of a school year . . ."; AS 
39.35.530 provides the same language for the Alaska Public Employees' 
Retirement System 
3
 The Hawaii Public Retirement System statutes provide in HI ST § 88-50: "The 
board of trustees may fix and determine by appropriate rules and regulations how 
much service in any year is equivalent to a year of service but in no case shall 
more than one year of service be credited in twelve calendar months,. . ." 
4
 Illinois Pension Code provides in 40 ILCS 5/13-401(e): "Overtime or extra 
service shall not be included in computing any service. Not more than one year of 
service credit shall be allowed for service rendered during any calendar year". 
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Minnesota10, Nebraska11, Pennsylvania12, Texas13 and Virginia14 all statutorily 
prohibit employees from receiving more than one year of service credit per year. 
5
 Indiana Teachers' Retirement System statutes provide in IC 5-10.4-4-2(c): 
"Except as otherwise specified, a member may not be granted more than one (1) 
year of credit for service in a calendar year or fiscal year". 
6
 Louisiana Public Retirement System statutes provide in LSA-R.S. 11:191: " . . . 
In no event shall such person be allowed to earn more than one year of service 
credit in any one year. Service credit earned in more than one retirement system 
or fund in any one year shall not be transferred or recognized reciprocally to attain 
more than one year of service credit in any one system in any one year"; 
Louisiana Public Retirement System statutes for city employees provides in LSA-
R.S. 11:3036(B) " . . . Not more than one year of service credit shall be allowed 
for all service rendered during any one calendar year"; and, Louisiana Teacher's 
Retirement System statutes provide in LSA-R.S. 11:701(9): " . . . A person may 
not obtain more than one year of service credit during any fiscal year". 
7
 Maine State Retirement System statutes provide in 5 M.R.S.A. § 17758(2): 
"Limitation: The member may not receive more than one year of service credit in 
any one-year period". 
8
 Maryland Employees' and Teachers' Retirement System statutes provide in MD 
Code, State Personnel and Pensions, § 22-302(b): "The Board of Trustees may 
not allow more than 1 year of service credit for a calendar year"; the same 
language in also in MD § 23-302(b), § 24-302(b), § 25-302(b), and § 26-302. 
9
 Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System statutes provide in 
M.C.L.A. 38.1368(3): "In computing terms of service, a year shall be a legal 
fiscal year at the time and place where the service was performed. Not more than 
1 year's service shall be counted for retirement purposes in any school fiscal 
year". 
10
 Minnesota Teacher's Retirement System statutes provide in M.S.A. § 
354.091(3): "in no case may a member receive more than one year of service 
credit for any fiscal year". 
11
 Nebraska School Employees' Retirement System statutes provide in Neb.Rev.St. 
§ 79-927(4): "The board may adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the 
granting of service credit in accordance with this section, but in not case shall 
more than one year of service be granted for all service in one plan year". 
12
 Pennsylvania School Employees Retirement System statutes provide in 24 
Pa.C.S.A. § 8302(a): " . . . In no case shall a member receive more than one year 
of credited service for any 12 consecutive months or a member who has elected 
multiple service receive an aggregate in the two systems of more than one year of 
credited service for any 12 consecutive months". 
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Additionally, no case law exists allowing an employee to receive more than one 
year of service credit per year. Thus, while multiple states have similar statutes to 
Utah, no state has adopted Petitioner's proposed interpretation of the law. 
In addition to other states, the purpose section of Title 49 contains relevant 
provisions showing the intent of the Legislature to limit service credit to one year 
for each year worked. All these provisions relate to the potential actuarial impact 
of Petitioner's argument. U.C.A. § 49-11-103 states, 
(1) The purpose of this title is to establish: 
(a) retirement systems and the Utah Governors1 and Legislators* Retirement 
Plan for members which provide: 
(i) a uniform system of membership; 
(ii) retirement requirements; 
(iii) benefits for members; 
(iv) funding on an actuarially sound basis; 
(v) contributions; and 
(vi) economy and efficiency in public service; and 
(b) a central administrative office and a board to administer the various 
systems, plans, and programs established by the Legislature or the board. 
(2) This title shall be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits and 
protections consistent with sound fiduciary and actuarial principals. 
(emphasis added). 
13
 Teacher Retirement System of Texas statutes provide in V.T.C.A., Government 
Code § 823.002(a): "The board of trustees by rule shall determine how much 
service in any year is equivalent to one year of service credit, but in no case may 
all of a person's service in one school year be creditable as more than one year of 
service". 
14
 Virginia Retirement System statutes provide in Va. Cod Ann. § 51.1-141: " . . . 
The Board shall not allow more than one year of service credit for all service 
rendered in any period of twelve consecutive months". 
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Thus, the purpose of this title contains several relevant provisions showing the 
policy of the legislature. All relate to the potential actuarial impact of Petitioner's 
argument. 
First, Title 49 creates retirement systems with a "uniform system of 
membership" and specific "retirement requirements". In other words, all 
employees in the same retirement system should abide by the same rules to qualify 
for a retirement benefit. However, Petitioner is attempting to bend the retirement 
rules in his favor by only working 17 years until being eligible to receive a 
retirement benefit, while other employees who work for one employer have to 
work 30 years before drawing a benefit. Nothing in law favors an employee who 
works for two public employers at the same time over one who works full time for 
one public employer. Yet, Petitioner attempts to artificially increase the 
retirement benefits of the individual who works two 20 hour per week jobs over an 
employee who works one 40 hour per week job. His argument that he should 
receive a benefit now clearly violates the policy of the legislature in Title 49 and 
would give him a windfall. 
Second, subsection 2 of U.C.A. §49-11-103 allows that "This title shall by 
liberally construed to provide maximum benefits and protections consistent with 
sound fiduciary and actuarial principles." Contrary to Petitioner's implication that 
"maximizing benefits" means accepting any argument made by a Petitioner to the 
Board, the Retirement Office has a specific duty to provide the statutory benefits 
in accordance with plain language of the statute and the Board's actuary's 
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assumptions. As discussed supra, the plain language of the statute supports the 
Board's position that Petitioner can only receive one year of service credit for one 
year of work. Yet, even if the statute is found ambiguous, Petitioner's arguments 
would conflict with sound actuarial principles, and thus violate the purpose of the 
Title 49. Ms. Lund from the retirement office, with 25 years of experience, 
testified that it was her understanding that granting more than one year of service 
credit for one year of actual work would have an adverse actuarial impact on the 
retirement system.15 Even without an actuary's testimony, common sense dictates 
that allowing more than one year of service credit for one year of actual work 
would have an actuarial impact on the retirement system. Because retirement 
benefits through URS are lifetime benefits, if an individual is able to draw on 
those benefits earlier in his lifetime, it will cost the retirement system more money 
because they will be paying out benefits for a longer period of time and will not 
get the benefit of investment returns over that extra time.16 In such a scenario, as 
Petitioner notes, contribution rates may need to be raised on ALL of the employers 
in the retirement system. Thus, Petitioner wants his double benefit at the expense 
of all the other public employers in the retirement system. This he cannot do. 
15
 If Mr. Whitaker believed that his argument was actuarially sound, he needed to 
provide an actuary to confirm his findings. However, no actuarial testimony was 
heard at the hearing to support Mr. Whitaker's position that he could receive more 
than one year of service credit for one year of actual work. 
16
 For example, if an employee is able to draw a $50,000 benefit at age 60, instead 
of 65, that employee would receive an extra $250,000 in benefits, and URS would 
not be able to receive any additional investment income over that time. 
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Third, contrary to Petitioner's statements in his Brief, when Petitioner 
becomes eligible to retire, he will receive a benefit based on all of his eligible 
service from each of his employers. Petitioner misconstrues the way his 
retirement benefit will be calculated in claiming that his employers have paid 
retirement contributions on his behalf, but he will receive no benefit for those 
contributions. Petitioner also misconstrues that his employers "purchased" service 
credit by paying retirement contributions. 
Under Title 49, service credit is used for both qualifying for a retirement 
benefit and in calculating a retirement benefit once an individual retires. See, 
U.C.A. §§ 49-13-401 and 402. U.C.A. § 49-13-401 sets forth the combination of 
age and years of service credit to qualify for a benefit. However, an employee 
may retire at any time with more than 30 years of service credit. 
Although Petitioner is not eligible to retire now given his age and years of 
service credit, Petitioner's retirement benefit, when he's eligible and chooses to 
retire, will be calculated by combining the retirement benefit he would receive 
from each of his positions with his different employers. See, Supplemental HT 
25:18-32:3. In other words, all the salary Petitioner earned from both his 
positions will be used in the calculation of his future retirement benefit. 
17 
Petitioner's final average salary is a component of the defined benefit formula 
under the Public Employees' Noncontributory Retirement System. The formula is 
final average salary times years of service credit x 2%. U.C.A. § 49-11-402. 
Thus, because URS will use the salary from each of Petitioner's positions to 
calculate his benefit, they should not also increase his service credit in calculating 
the benefit. 
31 
Further, employers do not "purchase" service credit for employees in 
paying retirement contributions. Retirement contributions, like term life insurance 
premiums, are used to spread the risk of retirement liability over a large number of 
individuals. These contributions do not correspond to an individual employee's 
benefits. All of the retirement contributions paid by his employers will be used to 
keep the system actuarially sound in calculating his benefits. Thus, by combining 
the retirement benefits from each of his employers, URS maximizes Petitioner's 
benefits in accordance with the statutes and sound actuarial principles and 
Petitioner does not receive the windfall he so desperately desires. Because of 
these reasons public policy favors the Board application of the statute. 
II. PETITIONER CANNOT PURCHASE SERVICE CREDIT UNDER U.C.A. § 49-11-
403(1)(D) BECAUSE HE HAS NO FORFEITED SERVICE CREDIT. 
Because Petitioner never forfeited any of his service credit, he is not 
eligible to purchase service credit under U.C.A. §49-1 l-403(l)(d). U.C.A. §49-
11-403 allows an individual to purchase service credit in limited circumstances. 
U.C.A. §49-1 l-403(l)(d) states in part, "A member . . . may purchase service 
credit equal to the period of the member's employment in the following:... (d) 
forfeited service credit in this state if the member does not qualify for an 
allowance based on the service credit.". Thus, a person is eligible to purchase 
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service credit under this subsection when a person: 1) previously received service 
i £ 
credit, and 2) forfeited that service credit. 
It is undisputed that Petitioner qualified for service credit of 17.087 years of 
service credit as of May 16, 2006. However, Petitioner's allegation that he 
qualified for 32+ years of service credit is incorrect. As stated supra, pursuant to 
U.C.A. §49-11-401(3)(c) and (e), Petitioner can only earn one year of service 
credit for each year of actual work. Petitioner's request to have "forfeited" service 
credit is entirely dependent on having service credit to forfeit. Of course, if 
Petitioner had service credit, he has no need to forfeit that service credit. Thus, 
although Petitioner is eligible to forfeit any of his 17.087 years of service credit, 
he cannot forfeit something he merely desires. 
Additionally, Petitioner has done nothing to forfeit any service credit. 
Petitioner wants this Court to claim he has "effectively" forfeited service credit. 
Petitioner's Brief at 33-34. However, as Petitioner admitted, "forfeitures are not 
favored in the law." See, Id. at n.19 {quoting Commercial Investment Corp. v. 
Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), quoting, Russell v. Park City 
Utah Corp. 506 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1973). Even in a contract where the 
18
 Judy Lund testified that a forfeiture of service credit typically happens 
when a person is in the Contributory Retirement System and takes a refund of 
his/her retirement benefit contributions and forfeits their previous service credit in 
that system. See, Supplemental HT at 15. 
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language is plain, a forfeiture enforcer must "comply strictly with the provisions 
of the contract", and "to enforce [the contract terms] it requires some affirmative 
act on the part of the [enforcer] to notify the [other party] of what specific 
provision of the contract the [enforcer] is proceeding under . . . " Commercial 
Investment Corp. 936 P.2d at 1109. 
In the retirement context, the notice requirement is similar. Although no 
specific statutory provision governs the forfeiture or relinquishment of service 
credit prior to retirement, U.C.A. §49-11-619 allows a retiree or beneficiary of a 
retirement benefit to "relinquish" or forfeit "a benefit under this title by signing an 
irrevocable written relinquishment." Without such a signed statement, no 
relinquishment or forfeiture is accepted by the Retirement Office. 
In this case, neither the retirement office nor Petitioner did anything either 
affirmatively or impliedly which would "effect" a forfeiture of any of Petitioner's 
17.087 years of service credit.19 Certainly, Petitioner failed to point to any 
19
 In the alternative, even if Petitioner establishes he had years of service credit 
which were effectively forfeited by the Retirement Office without a specific 
forfeiture, Petitioner's requested remedy that "the court determine that 
[Petitioner's retirement contributions paid by his employers] constitutes a 
purchase of service credits under section 49-11-403(3)" is an unavailable remedy 
for Petitioner under U.C.A. §49-11-607. U.C.A.§49-11-607 requires, "if excess 
contributions have been received by the office, the contributions shall be refunded 
to the participating employer or member who paid the contributions." In 
Petitioner's case, his employers paid all of his retirement contributions in the 
Noncontributory Retirement System. Thus, if excess contributions were paid on 
behalf of Petitioner, all the contributions must be returned to his employer, not to 
Petitioner. The employer could then decide whether to contribute those 
contributions toward a purchase of service credit for Petitioner under U.C.A. §49-
11-403, but would have no legal obligation to do so. 
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specific forfeiture. As such, Petitioner has nothing to forfeit, forfeited nothing, 
and does not qualify to purchase service credit under U.C.A. §49-11-403. 
IIL PETITIONER CANNOT PREVAIL ON A CLAIM FOR ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE 
BOARD AS A GOVERNMENT AGENCY BECAUSE HE FAILED TO SHOW 
EITHER AN UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE OR THAT HE REASONABLY RELIED 
ON THE BOARD'S STATEMENTS TO HIS DETRIMENT. 
Petitioner cannot prevail against the Board under equitable estoppel for two 
reasons. First, Petitioner failed to prove an unusual circumstance or grave 
injustice to obtain estoppel against the Board as a governmental entity. Second, 
even if the court applies the common law estoppel rules, Petitioner failed to show 
a Board statement inconsistent with later statements. 
A. ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE INVOKED AGAINST A GOVERNMENT ENTITY 
ABSENT UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND GRAVE INJUSTICE. 
"As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental 
entity. In Utah, there is a limited exception to this general principle for 'unusual 
circumstances' 'where it is plain that the interests of justice so require.' This 
exception applies, however, only if 'the facts may be found with such certainty, 
and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.'" 
In such an unlikely scenario, the potential amount of a service credit 
purchase would then be determined in accordance with U.C.A. §49-11-403(3)(b) 
which requires that, "(b) the amount of payment [for a service credit purchase] 
shall be determined by the office based on a formula that is: (i) recommended by 
the actuary; and (ii) adopted by the board.. . ." Nothing in this section allows 
Petitioner to fashion his own remedy or some other remedy opposite the plain 
language of U.C.A. §49-11-607 requiring the retirement office to return excess 
contributions to Petitioner's employer. 
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Anderson v. Public Service Comm % 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(finding that 
Commission was not estopped from revoking limousine company's certificate of 
convenience and necessity after allegedly orally settling all claims against 
company)(citations omitted). 
In Anderson v. Public Service Comm 'n, the court established the standard 
for a finding of the exception to an "unusual circumstance". The Court in 
Andersen held, "the few cases in which Utah Courts have permitted estoppel 
against the government have involved very specific written representations by 
authorized govt, entities." (emphasis added.) After tracing the specific written 
representations in previous cases, the Court stated, "these cases involve clear, 
well-substantiated representations by government, entities." Id. at 828; See also, 
Thimmes v. Utah State Univ., 2001 UT App. 93, |18, 22 P.3d 257, 259 ("The 
exception requires a high standard of proof and has only applied in cases 
involving "(very specific written representations by authorized government 
entities . . .)" quoting Anderson 839 P.2d at 827. Thus, in order to prevail on a 
claim for estoppel, Petitioner had to show a very specific written representation to 
have an unusual circumstance. 
In this case, Petitioner failed to prove an "unusual circumstance" or grave 
injustice. Marcia Stroud testified that both in November 2003 and September 
2005 when Petitioner contacted the Retirement Office for a retirement estimate, he 
was specifically advised that he would have 17.087 years of service credit as of 
May 16, 2006. HT 75-76. Thus, even though Petitioner believed he was entitled to 
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more service credit, or a different benefit calculation, this is not an unusual 
circumstance causing grave injustice. 
Similar to the facts here, several years ago Ogden City paid retirement 
contributions on behalf of its public safety officers for GAP time (extra time 
worked by employees) which was found to be specifically prohibited by the Utah 
State Retirement Act. See, O 'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Board, 929 P.2d 
1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); affirmed on other grounds, O 'Keefe v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 956 P.2d 279 (Utah 1998)(0'Keefe chose not to raise the 
estoppel issue before the Utah Supreme Court). Joseph O'Keefe, a former Ogden 
public safety officer, argued unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeals (using 
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) as 
his authority) that the Board should be estopped from denying GAP contributions 
in his final average salary because the board had accepted the contributions before 
learning of their ineligible nature, and because like Petitioner, he reasonably 
believed that the contributions were eligible to be included in the calculation of his 
retirement benefit. The Court of Appeals held that because O'Keefe "knew prior 
to his retirement that the Board had decided to reject GAP contributions . . . 
petitioner's estoppel claim does not rise to the level necessary to prevail against a 
state agency." O Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Board, 929 P.2d 1112, 1117 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Similarly, in Eldredge, the Court applied the same rule as that in O 'Keefe 
but held the Retirement Office liable. Similar to Petitioner, Mr. Eldredge 
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questioned whether his service rendered prior to the current Retirement Office's 
creation in 1961 was eligible for service credit. Unlike Petitioner, after direct 
consultation with the Retirement Office, Mr. Eldredge received multiple 
communications from the Retirement Office that this service credit was granted to 
him under law, including a letter stating these 6.123 years of service were eligible 
for service credit, and a retirement estimate showing that he had obtained these 
disputed years of service credit. Also unlike Petitioner, based upon these specific 
written representations by the Retirement Office, Mr. Eldredge terminated his 
position and irrevocably retired. Three months following his receipt of retirement 
benefits, the Retirement Office informed Mr. Eldredge that he must either 
purchase the 6.123 years of service credit or have his benefit recalculated without 
those years. The Court found that these representations crossed the line into an 
"unusual circumstance" to invoke estoppel against a government entity. 
Thus, in harmonizing both O 'Keefe and Eldredge, the clear rule regarding 
estoppel before the Board is that a person without a specific verified 
representation, who does not quit his position and retire based on that 
representation, cannot sustain a claim for estoppel.21 Here, like O 'Keefe, 
20
 The Board has only found two instances where the Courts have found an 
"unusual circumstance" to invoke estoppel against the government. See, 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm 'n, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979); 
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 
each case, the harm was severe. In is not here. Petitioner has not retired. 
Petitioner only hopes for a better benefit at some future day. 
21
 Petitioner argues that government estoppel is only applicable when the 
government acts in its official capacity and not in a proprietary capacity. See, 
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Petitioner has not terminated his positions nor retired. Furthermore, Petitioner's 
estimates and specific verified representations from the Board all consistently 
correctly stated his years of service credit (17.087 years as of May 16, 2006) after 
a review of his records. Thus, Petitioner has not proved either "facts with 
specificity," or "injustice of sufficient gravity" to invoke any exception to the 
general rule that estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity. 
Anderson v. Public Service Comm 'n, 839 P.2d at 827. 
B. PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE BOARD FAILS 
FOR A LACK OF STATEMENT, LACK OF RELIANCE AND NO INJURY, 
In the alternative, even if Petitioner could sustain an estoppel claim against 
the Board as a governmental entity, Petitioner cannot prove the elements of 
estoppel. Specifically, Petitioner did not prove any statement which the Board 
later refuted on which he reasonably relied to his detriment. The Utah Courts have 
stated that in order to prevail on a claim for equitable estoppel, Petitioner bears the 
burden to prove: 
Eldredge 795 P.2d 676-77. Yet this limitation to government estoppel has not 
been applied by the courts in any case in the past 17 years since Eldredge in 1990, 
despite numerous opportunities to do so. In fact, in the Board's most recent two 
estoppel cases, since Eldredge the court made no mention of any "proprietary 
capacity" limitation to the government estoppel rule. See, O 'Keefe v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 929 P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Terry v. Retirement 
Board, 2007 UT App 87. 
22
 Even Petitioner's annual statements all contain Petitioner's correct service credit. 
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(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act 
by one party inconsistent with a claim later 
asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by 
the other party taken on the basis of the first 
party's statement, admission, act or failure to 
act; and (3) injury to the second party that 
would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act. 
Holland v. Career Service Review Bd, 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993)(rejecting employee's equitable estoppel claim); See also, Eldredge(ho\6mg 
that Board was estopped from decreasing member's benefit after he terminated his 
employment and retired). Petitioner cannot meet the necessary elements of 
estoppel. 
First, the only claimed statement made by the Retirement Office 
representatives to Petitioner which were inconsistent with claims the Board later 
asserted was a one minute telephone call with Dustin Seeley in October 2005. 
Petitioner specifically testified he did nothing in detrimental reliance on this 
statement. All other statements with the Retirement Office, including the annual 
statements, were consistently correct. 
Nevertheless, even if the annual statements are found to be inconsistent 
with the Board's later asserted claims, Petitioner did not reasonably rely on them 
to his detriment. 
The next necessary element of estoppel is the reasonable action or inaction 
by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act 
or failure to act. For example, in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
40 
Comm % 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), the Plaintiffs spent over $200,000 in 
renovating their club in direct reliance on prior Liquor Commission's statements 
that they were in compliance with the law. In the Eldredge case, the Plaintiff quit 
his job and irrevocably retired based on prior information the Retirement Office 
had sent to him in specific letters and estimates. In the instant case, Petitioner 
testified that each year the Retirement Office sent him general annual statements 
informing him of his service credit for each employer (but not service credit 
totals). Each annual statement contained the following language, "If you are a 
member in more than one Retirement System, if you are a part-time elected or 
appointed official, or if you are employed with two or more employers at the same 
time, you will need to contact the Retirement Office." HR at 132, Thus, Petitioner 
could not reasonably rely on those statements without first contacting the 
Retirement Office. 
Nevertheless, Petitioner testified that in or about October 2003 he first 
contacted the Retirement Office to receive a retirement estimate. See, HT 136-137. 
In November 2003, he received his retirement estimate notifying him that as of 
May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time employment, he would have a total of 
17.087 years of service credit. 
Following the receipt of this estimate, Petitioner did not contact the 
Retirement Office again until August 2005 to inquire about his retirement, almost 
22 months later. See, HT 146. Petitioner provided no explanation as to why he 
waited so long to contact the Retirement Office again. Despite Petitioner's claim 
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that it was reasonable to do so because he received another annual statement in 
2004, Petitioner failed to explain the lack of contact with the Retirement Office 
during the five month gap between the 2003 estimate and receipt of the annual 
statement in April 2004. 
Then on August 29, 2005, at Petitioner's request, Marcia Stroud sent 
Petitioner a new estimate of retirement service credit showing the calculation of 
his service credit. See, HT 147. Petitioner made no satisfactory explanation as to 
why he asked for a new estimate. This 2005 estimate included a three year 
military service purchase and showed that on May 16, 2006, assuming continued 
full-time employment Petitioner would have 20.087 years of service credit. See, 
HT 147-148. This estimate amount of service credit was identical to Petitioner's 
previous estimate received in November 2003, but included the three-year military 
purchase. 
Petitioner testified that in October 2005, after receipt of this second 
estimate, he again contacted the Retirement Office and spoke with Dustin Seely 
via telephone. Mr. Seely told Petitioner that he had 31+ years of "unverified" 
service credit. See, HT 38. 
Testimony was provided that on November 2, 2005, in a meeting with 
Petitioner, Mr. Felshaw King, and Retirement Office employees Marcia Stroud 
and Chris Blevins, Retirement Office personnel again made clear to Petitioner that 
the Retirement Office could not give him more than one year of service credit per 
fiscal or calendar year under the statute. See, HT 121. 
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The Retirement Office Annual Statements claim the Petitioner has years of 
service credit for each of his employers, but each specifically states that if you are 
employed with two or more employers at the same time to contact the Retirement 
Office. Given Petitioner's situation with employment with two employers, he 
could not reasonably add the service credit on the Annual Statements. 
Petitioner also failed to do anything in reliance on the Board's statements. 
Petitioner testified that he has not terminated his employment, and he has not 
retired. See, HT at 151. Petitioner's sole claim of reliance was his speculation that 
he may have quit his state positions and taken another job. However, Petitioner did 
not provide any specific information as to whom the employer would have been, 
how much money he would have made, whether jobs were available or whether he 
was qualified to take such position. Thus, Petitioner failed to allege any actual 
reasonable reliance on the Retirement Office's statements, particularly in light of 
the Retirement Office's consistent specific statements that Petitioner could not 
receive more than one year of service credit for one year of actual work. 
Finally, Petitioner failed to prove harm based on the Retirement Office 
statements. The final element of estoppel is injury to the second party that would 
result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, 
admission, act or failure to act. Even after the hearing, it remains unclear whether 
23
 Although Petitioner made a vague reference that he would have made $3000 
more per year at a new job, he would have lost his benefits. Given the amount of 
potential retirement benefits he probably was better off financially staying with the 
State. 
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Petitioner has even made any claim for injury or damages at all - having only 
requested that he be able to retire with 30 years of service credit. The Court has 
held that in estoppel cases, "it is also a general rule of long standing that a plaintiff 
must show damages by evidence of facts and not by mere conclusions, and that the 
items of damage must be established by substantial evidence and not by 
conjecture." Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 
1984)(internal citations omitted). Here, at best, Petitioner only offers conjecture. 
Based on his age and years of service credit, Petitioner is not currently 
entitled to a retirement benefit. Petitioner simply cannot prove any harm based on 
the information the Retirement Office provided him, such as terminating his 
employment. In fact, Petitioner remained employed, earning additional money 
and service credit completely offsetting any speculative losses. Because any 
allegation of losses are mere conjecture and not established by any substantial 
evidence, Petitioner failed to prove any harm to him caused by the Retirement 
Office. 
In sum, Petitioner cannot prevail against the Board in an estoppel claim. 
The Court in O 'Keefe clearly stated that knowledge of a reduction in benefits prior 
to retirement "does not rise to the level necessary to prevail against a state 
agency." O'Keefe, 929 P.2d at 1117. Because Petitioner cannot prove reasonable 
reliance, or injury based on Retirement Office statements, he cannot make a 
successful estoppel claim against the Board. 
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IV. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO JUDICIAL 
REVIEW BY THIS COURT WAS ABRIDGED DUE TO A MALFUNCTION IN THE 
RECORDING OF THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS MOOT. 
The Board granted Petitioner the procedural rights of notice and 
opportunity to be heard. Yet, Petitioner argues that his due process right to 
judicial review by this Court has been abridged because the recording of the 
evidentiary hearing was interrupted due to a malfunction of the tape recorder. On 
May 24, 2007, a supplemental hearing was held before the AHO for the specific 
purpose of questioning Judy Lund, URS's Retirement Director. Petitioner 
appeared as well as counsel. Petitioner's counsel was given ample opportunity to 
question Judy Lund. Upon conclusion of that hearing, Petitioner's counsel and 
counsel for the Board entered into a stipulation that the record on appeal be 
supplemented with the transcript from the May 24, 2007 hearing. On June 7, 
2007, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an Order stating that "The record on 
appeal shall be supplemented with the May 24, 2007, hearing." Because the 
record has been supplemented with the testimony of Judy Lund Petitioner's 
argument regarding his denial of due process is moot and he has received his right 
to due process. 
V. T H E BOARD'S ORDER ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF 
ESTOPPEL IN ITS FINDING OF FACTS, AND THUS PETITIONER'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE NOT BEEN VIOLATED, 
The Board made sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion of law 
regarding estoppel that "Therefore, there are insufficient grounds to support an 
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estoppel against the Board." HRat375. Petitioner claims that because his 24 
proposed findings of fact were not adopted by the Board in its Order, the Order's 
Findings of Fact are insufficient regarding its denial of Petitioner's estoppel claim. 
See, Petitioner's Brief at 52. The Utah Supreme Court has found that, "it is 
essential that [an administrative body] make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail 
that the critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved in such a 
fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis . . .." Milne Truck 
Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986). The Board's 
Order sufficiently provides both the logical and legal basis for its determination 
regarding Petitioner's estoppel claim. The Order's Findings of Fact regarding 
Petitioner's estoppel claim states: 
8. The following or a similar notification was contained on every 
annual statement sent out by the Retirement Office, "If you are a 
member in more than one Retirement System, if you are a part-time 
elected or appointed official, or if you are employed with two or 
more employers at the same time, you will need to contact the 
Retirement Office." 
9. Petitioner testified that in or about October 2003, he contacted the 
Retirement Office to request a retirement estimate. In November 2003, he 
received the retirement estimate notifying him that as of May 16, 2006, 
assuming continued full-time employment, he would have a total of 17.087 
years of service credit. 
10. Marcia Stroud, Retirement Advisor for the Retirement Office, testified 
that on August 29, 2005, at Petitioner's request, she sent Petitioner a new 
retirement benefit estimate showing the calculation of Petitioner's 
retirement service credit. Different from the 2003 estimate, this estimate 
included a three-year service credit purchase for military service. The 
estimate showed that on May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time 
employment, Petitioner would have 20.087 years of service credit. 
11. Petitioner testified that on November 2, 2005, in a meeting with 
himself, Mr. Felshaw King, and Retirement Office employees Marcia 
Stroud and Chris B levins, the Retirement Office clearly explained to 
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Petitioner that he was not eligible for more than one year of service credit 
for one fiscal or calendar year of work. 
12. Petitioner testified that he has not retired or terminated his employment 
with either the State or the City. 
13. Petitioner testified that had he known in 1994 that he could not count 
toward his retirement two years of service credit for each year that he 
worked for two employers, he would have accepted another position with 
West Point City, would have resigned has job with the State, and would 
have gone back to work in the construction industry with his brother as an 
appraiser and would have earned about $3,000 more per year. Petitioner 
provided no other evidence that he sustained injury or harm due to his 
reliance on the Retirement Office's annual statements. 
HR at 371-373. 
Petitioner points to no reason why these findings are insufficient or 
incorrect. These findings clearly support the Board's decision to deny Petitioner's 
estoppel claims. The fact that the hearing officer failed to adopt Petitioner's 
proposed findings of fact does not make the facts adopted insufficient. It merely 
means the hearing officer either did not believe those facts, or they were not 
relevant to his decision. Hence, because the Board's Order's Findings of Fact 
provide a logical basis for its denial of Petitioner's estoppel claim, Petitioner's due 
process claims have not been violated. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board hereby asks this Court to reject Petitioner's appeal in its entirety. 
The Board correctly applied the plain language of LLC. A. §49-1 l-401(3)(c) and (e) 
which mandate that a retirement system member cannot receive more than one 
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year of service credit for one year of actual work. In addition, the Board correctly 
found that Petitioner cannot purchase service credit under U.C .A. §49-11-403(1 )(d) 
because he has no forfeited service credit. Furthermore, the Board correctly 
denied Petitioner's claim for equitable estoppel against the Board as a government 
agency because he failed to show either an unusual circumstance or that he 
reasonably relied on the Board's statements to his detriment. Finally, the Board 
asks this Court to deny Petitioner's claim of denial of due process based on the 
Board's Order's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law because the Order 
provides a logical basis for its denial of Petitioner's equitable estoppel claim. 
DATED this ( /p- day of tp^S— , 2007. 
Howard, Phillips & Andersen 
48 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to Phillip W. Dyer and Carey A. Seager 
Attorneys for Petitioner at 221 Kearns Building, 136 South Main Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101 on this the 7 . 7 . day of ^ u ^ - t 2007. 
'(x \k A/vv/L^rra^b^ 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
NORMAN 0. WHITAKER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 




: FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
File #: 06-03R 
Hearing Officer: Howe 
A hearing was held on June 14, 2006, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer on 
Petitioner's Request for Board Action. Norman O. Whitaker ("Petitioner") was present and 
represented by Phillip W. Dyer and Carey A. Seager. The Utah State Retirement Board 
("Board") was represented by David B. Hansen. Based upon the evidence in this matter and the 
legal memoranda submitted, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer issued his Ruling dated August 
15, 2006. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer now makes the following Recommended Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner is a member of the Public Employees Non-Contributory Retirement System 
("PERS") due to his employment with the State of Utah ("State") and West Point City ("City"). 
Petitioner is also a member of the Public Employees Contributory Retirement System due to his 
previous employment with Davis and Weber County Canal Agency ("County"). 
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2. PERS and PECRS are administered by the Utah State Retirement Office ("the Retirement 
Office"). 
3. Petitioner began working for the State on April 15, 1989, and is currently an active 
employee. 
4. Petitioner began working for the City on January 1,1994, and is currently an active 
employee. 
5. Petitioner was employed with the County from November 1,1989, through April 30, 
1993. Petitioner worked for a total of 3.5 years for the County. 
6. On September 14, 2005, the Retirement Office, at Petitioner's request, sent Petitioner an 
Estimate showing the calculation of his service credit. Petitioner's Estimate included a three 
year military service purchase. 
7. The Retirement Office sends out annual statements to all members who have 
contributions on record. The annual statements include total years worked for all participating 
employers. For example, the statement sent out after the end of 2004 read in part as follows: 
"SERVICE CREDIT PER SYSTEM AS OF DECEMBER 31,2004 
CONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [1] 3.500 YEARS 
NONCONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [2] 10.834 YEARS 
NONCONTRIBUTORY STATE AND SCHOOL [2] 15.654 YEARS'5 
"PLEASE EXAMINE THIS STATEMENT - If the balances shown on the accompanying 
statement are not correct, please write promptly giving details of any differences to our auditors, 
Deloitte & Touche, Attention: URS, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt Lake City, UT 
84144-0458, who are presently engaged in the regular examination of our financial statements. 
Correspondence should include your name, Social Security number, and a copy of this statement. 
If this statement is correct, no reply is necessary." (Emphasis in original). 
8. The following or a similar notification was contained on every annual statement sent out 
by the Retirement Office, "If you are a member in more than one Retirement System, if you are a 
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part-time elected or appointed official, or if you are employed with two or more employers at the 
same time, you will need to contact the Retirement Office." 
9. Petitioner testified that in or about October 2003, he contacted the Retirement Office to 
request a retirement estimate. In November 2003, he received the retirement estimate notifying 
him that as of May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time employment, he would have a total of 
17.087 years of service credit. 
10. Marcia Stroud, Retirement Advisor for the Retirement Office, testified that on August 29, 
2005, at Petitioner's request, she sent Petitioner a new retirement benefit estimate showing the 
calculation of Petitioner's retirement service credit. Different from the 2003 estimate, this 
estimate included a three-year service credit purchase for military service. The estimate showed 
that on May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time employment, Petitioner would have 20.087 
years of service credit. 
11. Petitioner testified that on November 2, 2005, in a meeting with himself, Mr. Felshaw 
King, and Retirement Office employees Marcia Stroud and Chris Blevins, the Retirement Office 
clearly explained to Petitioner that he was not eligible for more than one year of service credit 
for one fiscal or calendar year of work. 
12. Petitioner testified that he has not retired or terminated his employment with either the 
State or the City. 
13. Petitioner testified that had he known in 1994 that he could not count toward his 
retirement two years of service credit for each year that he worked for two employers, he would 
have accepted another position with West Point City, would have resigned has job with the State, 
and would have gone back to work in the construction industry with his brother as an appraiser 
and would have earned about $3,000 more per year. Petitioner provided no other evidence that 
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he sustained injury or harm due to his reliance on the Retirement Office's annual statements. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(4) places the burden of proof on Petitioner to prove that 
pursuant to Utah law, he is entitled to over 30 years of service credit having performed only 17 
years of actual work. Petitioner has not met this burden. 
2. Petitioner is precluded by Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3) (c) and (e) from earning more 
than one year of service credit in any one calendar or fiscal year. These statutory sections are not 
ambiguous. 
Utah Code Ann. §49-ll-401(3)(c) states, 
The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per month, and per year 
upon the basis of which one year of service an proportionate parts of a 
year shall be credited toward qualification for retirement. Service may be 
computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served 
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all of the 
service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not count for more 
than one year. 
Section (c) does not contain any qualification or limitation. It provides that ".. .All of the service 
rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not count for more than one year." This 
language must be interpreted to mean "all service" rendered by a public employee in one year 
whether to one or multiple employers. 
In addition, Utah Code Ann. §49-ll-401(3)(e) also supports this interpretation stating, "A 
member may not accrue more than one year of service credit per fiscal or calendar year as 
determined by the office." This subsection contains no qualification or limitation that would 
limit its application to one employer. It is immaterial whether the service is rendered to one 
employer or multiple employers. 
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3. Petitioner is not entitled to purchase service credit under the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-11-403 because he has no forfeited service credit. 
4. All retirement contributions from all employers of the Petitioner received by the 
Retirement Office will be used in calculating his retirement benefit at the time he retires. 
5. "As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity. In Utah, 
there is a limited exception to this general principle for 'unusual circumstances' 'where it is plain 
that the interests of justice so require.' This exception applies, however, only if'the facts may be 
found with such certainty, and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the 
exception."' Anderson v. Public Service Comm % 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(citations 
omitted). 
6. Even if Petitioner could have proven an "unusual circumstance" against the Board, 
Petitioner failed to prove sufficient grounds to prevail on any claim for equitable estoppel against 
the Board. The elements of equitable estoppel are: 
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by 
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) 
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the 
basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure 
to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result 
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
Hollandv. Career Service Review Bd.y 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
7. Although Petitioner misunderstood when he would be eligible to retire, the undisputed 
facts do not give rise to an unusual circumstance to prevail on an estoppel claim against the 
Retirement System. None of the annual statements gave Petitioner a "total" amount of his 
service credit and each statement advised him to contact the Retirement Office if he was 
employed by two or more employers at the same time. Because he failed to do so, his reliance 
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on his interpretation of the amounts on the annual statements was not reasonable, and he did not 
suffer any damage because of any reliance. 
When Petitioner first contacted the Retirement Office in 2003, he was correctly told that 
he would have 17.087 years of service credit as of May 16, 2006. Petitioner failed to contact the 
Retirement Office again until September 2005 when he requested another estimate with a three 
year military purchase. Petitioner was then told that he would have 20.087 years of service 
credit as of May 16, 2006, if he made a military service purchase. Although Petitioner was 
verbally informed in mid-October 2005 by a Retirement Office customer service representative 
that he had over 31 years of "unverified" service credit, the Retirement Office quickly corrected 
such a statement, and on November 2, 2006, the Retirement Office clearly informed Petitioner 
that he could not receive more than one year of service credit for one year of actual work. 
These facts do not rise to the level of an "unusual circumstance" to create an estoppel 
against the Board as a governmental entity. Further, Petitioner proved no reasonable reliance 
on the Board's statements, nor did he prove damages to prevail on a claim for estoppel against 
the Board. Therefore, there are insufficient grounds to support an estoppel against the Board. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this proceeding. 
BOARD RECONSIDERATION 
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for 
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. §49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial 
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review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and 
one copy sent by mail to each person making the request. The Board chairman or executive 
director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20) days of 
receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
If Petitioner is aggrieved with the final Board order, he may seek a judicial review within 
thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued. Petitioner 
shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board actions resulting from formal proceedings. All 
petitioners shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16. 
DATED this cftf^day of October, 2006. 
j^C^'^^J^) 
Richard C. Howe 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer 
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The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer are hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement 
Board. 
Dated this ^*~ day of -October, 2006. 
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